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 Housing prices in real terms keep rising in major US cities.  This is in part 
because housing construction is increasingly regulated in the high-income American 
metropolitan areas (Gyourko, Saiz and Summers, 2008). Higher housing values also 
reflect the capitalization of amenities that are generated by increasing public 
investments in the urban environment, such as transit, public space, culture and 
leisure facilities, and improved environmental quality and safer streets, as 
documented by an extensive empirical literature1 (Cheshire, Nathan and Overman, 
2013).  
These facts – and others that I will consider later in this article -- do not sit 
comfortably with an academic literature that claims that cities have become more 
“neo-liberal.” According to this literature, cities and regions suffer from widespread 
abandonment of classical forms of state intervention – as a developer and regulator – 
in favor of weaker state or public sector involvement in them, extensive 
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privatization, and imposition of a pervasive “market mentality”  (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002; Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010; Theodore, Peck and Brenner, 
2011; Jessop, 2002; Peck, 2012; Theodore and Peck, 2011; Tasan-Kok and Baeten, 
2012).  
 For some analysts, the withdrawal of the state is said to combine with policies 
that are less equity-oriented and more tolerant of inequality, as well as a 
management style that apes the market through various types of entrepreneurial or 
competitive policy forms (Harvey, 2005).  This same literature makes the somewhat 
contradictory claim that urban and public management has become more important 
due to a “re-scaling” of the state downward (i.e. devolution), to cities and regions, 
apparently making room for the weakening of classical organized welfare or dirigiste 
social and economic management.  But in turn, these local states (cities) then act like 
market-playing entrepreneurs (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).  
In this paper I argue that evidence does not support a claim of blanket 
withdrawal of the public sector from cities, de-regulation of city life, reduction of 
urban public goods, or decline in the role of inter-regional transfers in shaping 
regional development.  Indeed, on balance the evidence suggests a steady increase in 
public sector investments, public goods and regulation in urban and regional affairs, 
and this is a worldwide phenomenon. For example, regional development funds 
(“Cohesion funds”) provided publically to lagging regions amount to as much as 5% 
of the GDP of poorer European Union member states.  In the United States, federal 
transfers between states are as much as 30% of the discretionary (non-retirement or 
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health care) of the federal budget, and much more if health care and retirement are 
included; such figures are considerably higher for France (Davèzies, 2008).  
As noted, some of the neo-liberalism literature argues that instead of a 
massive withdrawal of the state or de-regulation of urban life (or societal 
management in general), some of the techniques of public management, service 
provision, urban anti-poverty programs, and many other policy domains involve 
techniques and program design that are different from those we associate with late-
19th to mid-20th century welfare and regulatory states. I shall agree with this claim 
but argue that the neo-liberalism is indiscriminate in labeling many of these changes 
neo-liberal.  A closely allied claim of some of the neo-liberalism literature is that neo-
liberalist forces, rather than abandoning state power, have hijacked it for the 
purposes of advancing an agenda that mixes laissez-faire ideologies, cronyism and 
oligarchy in an opportunistic manner (Mirowski, 2013).   
I shall agree with the latter claim, up to a point, but disagree with the use of 
the term “neo-liberal” to understand that agenda.  This is because the neo-liberalism 
literature mis-uses the label “neo-liberal.”   By failing to master theories of liberalism, 
much of the neo-liberalism literature attributes virtually all de-regulation, laissez-
faire, tolerance of inequality, cronyism, and oligarchic behavior as outgrowths of 
liberalism itself, or as Ferguson (2010: 171) puts it, “…. a sloppy synonym for 
capitalism itself, or as a kind of shortand for the world economy and its inequalities.”   
This failure leads the critical neo-liberalism literature to make pervasive errors in 
evaluating and labeling real world public policies, but also – and perhaps more 
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importantly – in locating their causes, and gives it an ominous anti-capitalist 
drumbeat.  
Beyond specific policies, the critical neo-liberalism literature sees neo-
liberalism as a broad socio-political-cultural process of socialization, much in the way 
formulated by Polanyi (1944).  This process view explores “neoliberal 
governmentality” underpinned by the making of neo-liberal subjects. Thus,  
…(a)nother, more interesting usage sees ‘neoliberalism’ as the name of a 
broad, global cultural formation characteristic of a new era of ‘millenial 
capitalism’ – a kind of global meta-culture, characteristic of our newly de-
regulated, insecure and speculative times (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000).  
And finally, ‘neoliberalism’ can be indexed to a sort of ‘rationality’ in the 
Foucauldian sense, linked less to economic dogmas or class projects than to 
specific mechanisms of government, and recognizable modes of creating 
subjects.”  (Ferguson, 2010: 171). 
 The culture of millennial capitalism has certainly generated a wide variety of 
new social practices, beliefs and subjectivities (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000).  But 
the neo-liberalism literature assesses these in a flawed manner, mixing valuable 
insights with significant over-reach and simplification of the sources of changes in 
social practices and the nature of those practices.  
Overall, this paper agrees with Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2010:183), when 
they argue that  “’neoliberalism’ has become something of a rascal concept  – 
promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and 
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frequently contested”  (cf. Mudge, 2008). I shall thereore work in the spirit of 
Venugopal (2015: 15), who argues that  
…even if neoliberalism were such an extraordinarily tangled and messy 
phenomenon that has myriad, contradictory forms, there must nevertheless be 
some minimal set of defining common characteristics that would warrant 
preserving it. Much of what is explained – and hence left under-explained –  
as neoliberal can benefit, if it were simply to be disconnected from this 
universalizing framework and if neoliberalism were to be reconceptualized 
down in a sharper and unambiguous way to one of its constituent forms.  
  
 Once we have done this archeology of the de-regulationist version of 
liberalism and the governmentality version, we will then, in the final section of this 
article, illustrate how these mis-labels and over-reaches are projected into the 
literature’s representations of supposedly neo-liberal policies and practices in cities.   
   
What is neo-liberalism in political-economics ? 
 
 
One of the two core constituent forms of so-called neoliberalism is economics 
and the political or policy extensions of economics.   To begin the task of defining the 
economics of neo-liberalism in a tractable way, it must be seen in relation to its 
forebear, liberalism.2  Liberal economics forms a sub-set of a wider field of liberal 
social thought and political theory. Liberalism developed in response to royalist, 
traditionalist and divine conceptions of social order.  It provides a rationale for 
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limited states, whose legitimacy comes from free citizens in self-governed 
democracies, rather than subjects governed by royalty or clergy. The core of liberal 
thought in the classical writings of John Stuart Mill is restraint on organized state 
power in favor of creating a large sphere of individual autonomy and liberty to act 
without approval from a supreme authority. This notion is “liberal” in the sense that 
there is presumption in favor of the freedom of the individual unless there is a 
specific and justifiable reason for limiting this freedom (Mill, 1864; Fawcett, 2014). 
Liberal thought has economic elements (markets and exchange), political 
elements (rule-bound, chartered states) and sociological elements (the merchant and 
productive classes, “free labor,” entrepreneurial individuals, de-traditionalized ways 
of life, mobility). In the course of the Enlightenment and then the Industrial 
Revolution, liberals began to develop what would become the theoretical apparatus 
of modern economics.  They considered how complex and decentralized economic 
systems – firms, production chains, far-flung markets – could be coordinated. Adam 
Smith (1776) famously replied with his “invisible hand” theory, which holds that 
decentralized institutions (such as markets) are adept at revealing and processing 
information about preferences and hence at establishing prices that allocate goods 
and services in the right proportions. Smith aggregates upward, as an individualist 
and utilitarian, arguing that self-interested action can lead to highly- organized and 
collectively desirable outcomes.  
 The invisible hand theory is widely caricatured in contemporary writings on 
neo-liberalism.  Smith had generally negative views not only about state monopoly 
or planning, but also about private monopoly and concentration of power. In the 
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Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), he railed against “the wretched spirit of 
monopoly.” Smith was hostile to “greedy merchants” because they violated the 
central principle of the invisible hand as a fair game, where specialists trade their 
skills in a division of labor, for mutual benefit of both parties to the trade. He was 
systematic in his criticism of special interests and privileges, and he pointed out, 
centuries before Mancur Olson (1965) that organized state power is frequently 
hijacked by private actors to limit competition and distort markets for their benefit.  
He presaged the modern justification of liberal economics for public policy to insure 
that markets remain competitive, not rigged for monopolists or for the rich and 
powerful (Phillipson, 2010). 
Liberalism has widely varying positions on precisely where the border 
between markets and states should lie. Progressive liberal economists carve out a 
wide sweep of action for the state by virtue of an expansive technical and empirical 
definition of market failures (Stiglitz, 2009).  Other versions of modern liberalism 
place the cursor in the middle (Tirole and Laffont, 1993) and still others find that 
market failures are less abundant (“freshwater” or Chicago economics) (Ebenstein, 
2015).   
Underpinning these differences are technical debates in economics over 
precisely how much, and in what areas, markets tend to fail. These debates concern 
the nature and scope of externalities, free rider effects and moral hazards in firms 
and markets; whether market transaction costs are so high as to stifle production and 
exchange; and whether market fragmentation is a good rival to centralized state or 
monopoly provision. Thus, liberals do not have a monolithic vision of the role of the 
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state, large corporations, “the capitalist class,” or any of a host of other important 
dimensions of modern capitalism.  Liberals do not have an automatic preference in 
favor of, or against, state action.  They take each instance of market function 
empirically, and are open to regulation, incentives and public/state provision on a 
case-by-case basis, often making strong cases in favor of public regulation (Tirole and 
Laffont, 1993).  We might say that liberalism has a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
limited states, but that liberal theory itself develops the theories and empirical tools 
to rebut the presumption. 
A principal concern of liberalism is distribution or equity.  Even when private 
markets maximize aggregate economic output or growth, they are likely to have 
unequal income and wealth creation effects, which change in direction and 
magnitude over time. Liberal economists are concerned to distinguish the inequality 
that comes from properly functioning markets (reflecting changes in the relative 
prices of different kinds of labor) from inequality generated by powerful interests 
who take more than their proper share (“rent earners”) (Autor, 2014; Atkinson, 2015).  
Liberal sociologists argue that while some forms of inequality may maximize 
economic output, they may nonetheless be corrosive of social cooperation, individual 
mobility, and human character, thus cancelling out in the long-run the short-run 
benefits of economic efficiency (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).  Contemporary liberal 
analytical philosophers – especially Rawls, Dworkin and Sen -- explore the normative 
dimensions of navigating these complex trade-offs (Sen, 2009).  They propose a wide 
variety of models of social justice that can inform liberal policy choices.  
In contrast to this textured nature of liberalism, a good deal of the critical neo-
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liberalism literature displays an a priori preference for statist or collectivist society, 
and tends to caricature market economies and limited states as inherently oppressive 
and inegalitarian (Harvey, 2005; 2014; Leitner et al, 2007; Peck 2010; Mirowski, 2013).   
They caricature liberal economics or, as it has been stated in respect to the 
neoliberalism literature: “….there is something very inadequate about the way that 
mainstream economics is understood, theorized, critiqued, and represented outside 
that realm (Venogupal, 2015: 18). 
Let’s consider an example of this in an area that figures prominently in the 
neo-liberalism literature: privatization of public services. As Ferguson (2010: 172) 
states this: 
Neoliberalism…..puts governmental mechanisms developed in the private 
sphere to work within the state itself, so that even core functions of the state 
are either subcontracted out to private providers, or run (as the saying has it) 
‘like a business.’ 
Along these lines, a standard economic analysis might conclude that privatizing 
garbage collection is preferable to public provision. Many cities privatize their 
garbage collection so that they can gain access to economies of scale (a large private 
company that serves many cities can offer greater efficiency than the scale at which 
many cities can self-provide).  In this case, liberal economics favors privatization 
because it makes garbage collection cheaper to the inhabitants of the city in question, 
in a pragmatic rather than ideologically-constructed policy change.   Privatization 
might also improve service quality if a firm specializing in urban services can do 
better than a public administration that has many and varied tasks. But such a 
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change will alter the level of public employment, and this side effect is taken in gh 
neo-liberalism literature to be an indicator of hostility to states and evidence of the 
deployment of neoliberal reason.  
In reality, there can be uses and mis-uses of the border between states and 
markets (in both directions, too much state and too much privatization, as we will 
discuss below).  There is no reason in principle, however, to consider all such policy 
changes as evidence of a putative neoliberal hostility to states.   Seen in this light, the 
neoliberalism literature deploys the notion of “neo-liberal” as “a contextual 
wallpaper, for example in relationship to the ‘neoliberal age’ or ‘paradigm’ rather 
than as an analytical work-horse” (Venogupal, 2015:5) 
 
 




In the first half of the twentieth century, there was a movement whose 
participants labelled themselves “neoliberal.”  The project of these self-described 
neo-liberals was to revive liberalism in the face of totalitarianism and authoritarianism.  
A second period ensued, emanating mostly from the USA, from the late 1960s 
onward.  The participants in this movement did not (and still do not) label themselves 
“neo-liberal;” this is an attribution is given to them exclusively by scholars who are 
critical of markets, de-regulation, and capitalism in general (Fawcett, 2014; Turner, 
2008).  Hence, I shall now argue that much of the critical neoliberalism literature has 
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therefore erred in arguing for continuity and substantive similarity between the self-
described neo-liberalism of the 1920s-1940s, and the recent thought it insists on 
labelling  “neo- liberalism.”  Once we see this, we can properly isolate what the neo-
liberalism literature seems to be after, and provide it an appropriate label.  
From the 1920s through the 1940s, the Austrian liberals – Popper, Mises, 
Hayek and Schumpeter –reacted to the specific context of Europe in the 20th century.  
For these thinkers, the 18th and 19th centuries saw the expansion of liberalism, albeit 
with fits and starts.  But the early 20th century in Europe seemed to be one where the 
forward march of liberalism had been reversed. This reversal began with 
totalitarianism (Soviet) and authoritarianism (fascist and Nazi).  It continued, as the 
Great Depression worked its damage across Europe in the societies that had been 
mostly spared totalitarianism and authoritarianism, but which responded to the 
Depression with dirigiste economics.  The Austrian School saw the new “planned 
economy” (or any form of strong dirigisme) as encouraging authoritarianism through 
the back door. 
The founding public moment for this project of reviving liberalism was the 
Colloque Walter Lippmann in Paris in 1938, organized by the French philosopher 
Louis Rougier to consider the implications of Lippmann’s book, The Good Society 
(1937).  Neo-liberalism as a term, coined by a seminar participant (Alexander 
Rüstow) was chosen to underscore the intent to reinvigorate the liberalism that the 
attendees saw as being under attack by collectivist policies, whether of the Right or 
Left. The initial phase of discussion led to the founding of the Mont Pelèrin Society in 
1947.  The neo-liberalism of the colloquium – inspired by Lippmann – targeted 
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turning away from strict 19th century (so-called “Victorian”) laissez-faire toward 
German-style ordo-liberal economics, a form of social market economy under the 
aegis of a strong state.  
John Maynard Keynes, from 1936 onward, developed the macro-economics of 
neoliberalism, arguing for a strong role for the state, while rejecting detailed 
indicative state planning (i.e. dirigisme) of the French kind  (Cohen, 1979). Hayek and 
Mises were inspired by Frank Knight’s (1921) theories of information.  According to 
this theory, centralized bureaucracies can only manage statistically predictable risk 
situations, whereas markets can process true forward uncertainty, as in the case of 
innovation. Planning is therefore good for some basic tasks of economic 
management, such as building big infrastructures, but is inferior to markets in seeing 
the future.  
The young Milton Friedman struck a more balanced tone, in the technical 
language of modern economics. His 1951 article, “Neoliberalism and its Prospects,” 
criticized 19th century Victorian laissez-faire doctrines as not having sufficient 
concern about the emergence of concentrated economic power and inequality.  
Friedman argued that the solution was neither the 20th century forms of economic 
dirigisme that had emerged from the 1930s onward, nor laissez-faire.  He wrote that 
neoliberalism “must explicitly recognize that there are important positive functions 
that must be performed by the state.” Thus, 
“…the government would have the function of relieving misery and distress. 
There is justification for subsidizing people because they are poor, whether 
they are farmers or city-dwellers, young or old.”  (1951:90) 
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Friedman’s other main role for the state is to encourage competition and the use of 
the price system, and especially to prevent monopolists, rent-seekers and bureaucrats 
from obviating its functions. Hayek also reserved an important role for the state in 
regulating markets and insuring provision of public goods.  The Road to Serfdom 
(1944) advocated universal minimum levels of food, shelter, clothing and other basic 
needs (Ebenstein, 2003). Moreover, Hayek (1944) deplored the use of market ideas by 
social conservatives, writing that they were “paternalistic, nationalistic and power-
adoring….traditionalistic, anti-intellectual and mystical” (Easterly, 2014: 23).  Hayek 
was a cosmopolitan modernist,3 who believed that informed autonomous citizens 
deserved more freedom than would be reserved for them under a strongly 
bureaucratic state, even when it was well intentioned and “protective,” such as in 
European welfare states.   
What the critical neo-liberalism literature calls “neo-liberalism” emanated 
from Chicago, Virginia, and Rochester, beginning in the 1950s.  Stedman-Jones (2012) 
shows how this “transatlantic neoliberalism” became “divorced from its complicated 
and varied origins,” notably the concerns for the border between state and market 
and the benefits of social market economies.  Instead, it takes a decidedly backward 
turn toward 19th century laissez-faire, but with much better analytical tools.  The seed 
for this was sown in Ronald Coase’s (1937) paper on the theory of the firm, but it lay 
on fallow ground until the 1950s.  Coase did something quite paradoxical;  in the 
guise of a paper that provided a rationale for large firms (“hierarchies,” or 
bureaucracies), he extended the justification for spot markets as the default position 
for economic organization.  Everything other than the market, whether states or large 
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firms, henceforth had to be justified as a case of being more efficient than the market  
(usually because some bureaucracy would allow lower transaction costs or reduce 
moral hazards in coordinating complex production systems).  
By the late 1950s, Chicago economists such as George Stigler, Aaron Director, 
and Gary Becker took up where Coase left off, pushing free market analytical models 
into areas such as macroeconomics, industrial organization, information theory and 
consumer choice.  In Virginia, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) extended 
these insights into models of government, deftly labeling them “public choice.”    
Public choice theory, in this sense, took on issues of governability that had been 
raised by liberal theory.  Liberal economists, such as Lionel Robbins (1938) and 
Kenneth Arrow (1951), showed that we do not have institutions to reach widespread 
consensus  (“social choice”) in diverse individualistic and free societies, most 
famously in Arrow’s theory of the “impossibility” for electoral democracy to do this 
(in a modern update of Condorcet).4  Arrow – prefiguring Amartya Sen -- believed 
that the solution was messy interactions involving decentralized states, civil society, 
and competitive markets, with a strong role for public debate. Buchanan and Tullock 
took a different tack, calling for states to be down-sized and to function internally 
like markets, offering competing and differentiated products to the citizenry, 
especially in the area of public goods. This now starts to resemble something like 
what authors such as Mirowski (2013) identify as “neo-liberalism.” 
  By the early 1970s, these Americans had indeed shed many of the Smithian 
concerns of the Mont Pelèrin group, concerning the risks of concentrated private 
power, market failures and inequality (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; Stedman-Jones, 
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2012). The stagflation crisis of the 1970s created receptive audiences for monetarist 
macroeconomic models developed in Chicago to counter Keynesianism, which were 
then used more broadly to defend down-sizing of the public sector. Along these 
lines, Ebenstein (2015) documents the ways that Hayek and Friedman became 
libertarian, writing that “the virtual neoanarchism that both preached” later on 
placed them “outside the classical liberal tradition” (italics added), adding that “classical 
liberalism is not libertarian. “  
The stage was set, in this way, for the emergence of a third, more political, 
phase. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher declared themselves in favor of 
competition in a liberal way (read: labor unions; crony corporations; entrenched 
bureaucrats), like the Milton Friedman of 1951.  But in practice, they supported 
different types of new organized interests, mostly private and increasingly 
plutocratic. They opened up a chasm between the self-described neo-liberalism of 
Mont Pelèrin and its acolytes and themselves, by lending their brand to a neo-
Victorian laissez-faire hostility to the state (“public choice theory” and 
“Chicagonomics”). This was then used to move the cursor on applied work on 
deregulation; while left-Liberal economists in the 1970s and 1980s saw expanded 
possibilities for de-regulation as an extension of their long-term concern (dating back 
to Adam Smith) with monopoly and corporate power, the Chicago-Virginia-
Rochester axis rejected even mild market failure models, which were tagged by the 
Reagan-Thatcherites as mere Left-wing bias against markets.5  
A third dimension of this late 20th-century movement was its opportunistic 
syncretism of extreme laissez-faire in certain domains, with de facto support for rent-
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seeking monopolies, cronyism, and elite corporatism in other areas (Crouch, 2011). A 
closely linked fourth dimension – especially in the USA – consisted of an increasing 
tolerance for the influence of corporate and private funding of public policy decision-
making and political campaigns.  This latter feature was justified by the claim that 
since interest groups have become so much more numerous and competitive, 
electoral democracy itself should be a mirror of that rough-and-tumble competition, 
with any means possible.  In contrast, one of the central concerns of the Austrian 
liberals was limiting concentrated political power because of its inherent tendency to 
potentiate cronyism, corruption and oligarchy in policies.  
Finally, again in the USA, new right-wing think tanks were more and more 
comfortable with marriages of convenience to neo-conservative social policies, 
arguing that social order and integration should come exclusively from individual 
responsibility, family or religion.  The American right-wing has since then mostly 
argued (with little convincing evidence) that public goods and income supports 
encourage irresponsibility and hence backfire (Murray, 1984).   The American 
libertarians -- in their discourse of return to family and community -- thus flirt with 
aspects of anti-modernism that resemble those of the contemporary European right-
wing, and which were abhorrent to the resolute modernist sociology of Hayek, 
Mises, Schumpeter and Lippman. This is very different from European social market 
liberalism, as in its Scandinavian versions, where social integration is believed to be 
strengthened through state regulation, widely-shared public goods, and income 
supports.  
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Allied to the preceding point, these contemporary oligarchic-libertarians have 
attempted to minimalize the importance of growing inequality in income distribution 
or wealth, arguing that it comes from efficient markets and has benefits for economic 
growth and social mobility. The Institute of Economic Affairs and the American 
Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, among others, became proponents of the idea 
that social and economic inequalities are necessary to economic dynamism.  This 
contrasts to liberalism and neo-liberalism (as in Friedman, 1951), and liberal 
analytical philosophy has the most active conceptual debates about inequality from 
Rawls, to Dworkin to Amartya Sen (Sen, 2009; Dworkin, 2000).  Scholars of neo-
liberalism such as Mirowski (2013) devote considerable attention to documenting the  
use of state authority to enforce these plutocratic and cronyist policies. 
But this is also where the historiographical error of the critical neo-liberalism 
literature can be pinpointed. It claims that there are many threads of neo-liberalism 
and many versions of it, but then it concludes that they all lead to the same place and 
are of a piece, which they call “neo-liberalism.” But as we have seen, “Reagan + 
Thatcher + American libertarianism + the Chicago-Virginia-Rochester axis” are 
neither essentially liberal nor neo-liberal in the sense of the Mont Pelèrin group or its 
post-war acolytes. It follows that there is a basic error of historiography contained in 
the use of the moniker “neo-liberalism” to cover everything from Mont Pelèrin 
through this oligarchic, plutocratic power combined with Victorian laissez faire.  
The stakes in this issue of history and labels are high.  Using the term “neo-
liberal” to refer to everything from Mont Pelèrin to today’s radical laissez-faire-
public choice-crony-plutocratic doctrines makes the term so polysemic that it 
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obscures the fundamental differences in theory and policy these two types of thought 
defend. It facilitates an indiscriminate critique of capitalism, and represents 
liberalism as somehow inherently hostile to states, to public goods, to regulation, and 
to social and economic equality and opportunity and in favor of plutocratic power 
and cronyism.    In some cases this may be due to the outright Marxisant 
commitments of many authors in the critical neo-liberalism literature, for whom 
these distinctions seem to be invidious (e.g. Harvey, 2005, 2014: Leitner et al, 2007).  
In other cases, it may be due to failure to master basic economic concepts:  
Neoliberalism purports to provide a lens through which this mysterious and 
hostile terrain (i.e. economics) can be surveyed, simplified, labeled and 
rendered understandandable from a safe distance.  Economic theory can thus 
be vicariously critiqued and dismissed without one having to encounter it, 
much less understand it” (Venogupal, 2015: 16). 
 
 Concretely, in order to establish that we live in a world shaped by the 
imposition of market-forcing policies for reasons that are principally ideological and 
not pragmatic or utilitarian, the critical neoliberalism literature would need to deploy 
liberal analytical economics in two ways. First, it would need to show that such 
measures are unjustified in terms of the utilitarian efficiency border of states versus 
markets that is defined by liberal economics.  They would need to demonstrate that 
these measures are principally imposed to create rigged markets and rent-earning 
opportunities (i.e. market distortion through monopoly).  Secondly, they would have 
to consider the distributional (inequality or income) effects of measures that are 
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justified by the state-market border in efficiency terms, but where such efficiency 
gains are somehow outweighed by the negative consequences of the distributional 
effects (as in the ways suggested by Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Frank, 2011).   
Alternatively, they would have to show intentionality, i.e. that such policies really 
are designed and intended to enhance the effects they demonstrate and are not 
unintended effects of a complex and pragmatic political process.  
 
Neoliberalization as a process:  governmentality 
 
 In 1983, toward the end of his life, Michel Foucault gave a course at the 
Collège de France on “the government of oneself and others” (le gouvernement de soi et 
les autres) (Foucault, Fontana and Gros, 2001).6    In doing so, he stated that he would 
rely on three main domains of inquiry: knowledge, power and the making of the 
subject (la connaissance, le pouvoir, et la subjectivation).7   
 Foucault is the oft-stated inspiration for one of the principal themes of the 
critical neoliberalism literature. Its argument is that neo-liberalism is much more than 
economic policy; it is also composed of many Foucauldian dispositifs.8  In this view, 
neoliberalization is a process of transforming society and its subjects, notably by 
deploying practices that make more and more of us come to have a market-based or 
neo-liberal subjectivity. Any process of neo-liberalization is thus much more than 
policy measures.  It would consist of defining the kinds of know-how or 
“techniques” of society to which individuals have access (i.e. neo-liberal in nature). 
These techniques and analytical frameworks are deployed through many concrete 
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practices,  such that neo-liberalism becomes a normative framework for people, a 
way that they make choices and justify them.  Thus, subjectivity is the vehicle for 
neo-liberal power (Protevi, 2009).  Stated more conventionally, this would be the 
political sociology of a neo-liberal world: 
…..new constructions of ‘active’ and ‘responsible’ citizens and communities 
are deployed to produce governmental results that do not depend on direct 
state intervention.  The ‘responsibilized’ citizen comes to operate as a 
miniature firm, responding to incentives, rationally assessing risks, and 
prudently choosing from among different courses of action.  (Ferguson, 2010: 
172). 
  
 The idea that types of actors and subjectivities evolve and are produced in 
relation to social systems is nothing new in sociology, in domains ranging from love 
to child rearing to economics.  In economic sociology, Max Weber (1922) thoroughly 
evaluated the advent of the bureaucratic, rational actor (and role playing) in relation 
to modern economic activity.  Polanyi (1944) of course, worked at the aggregate level 
in speaking of great transformations of the mentalities and rationalities that he 
claimed underlay capitalism; as an anti-liberal, Polanyi opposed Hayek, Schumpeter 
and Smith, emphasizing the corrosive and anomie-producing character of market 
societies and their internalized subjectivities.  Though he fashioned himself a 
progressive, his critique closely echoes those of the classical 19th century anti-
Enlightenment conservatives such as Burke, Herder and de Maistre.  Hayek’s famous 
polemic about the road to serfdom was also about subjectivation and social practices; 
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for him, ideal free individual of liberalism would be subjected not to a reassertion of 
aristocratic privilege, nor the church, but to the diffuse power of many masters in the 
state bureaucracies, whether totalitarian, authoritarian or dirigiste. Joseph 
Schumpeter, another self-labeled neo-liberal, added a critique of the “society 
forming” aspect of the new collectivism.  Schumpeter (1942) saw capitalism as a 
dynamic system of “creative destruction,” which required a certain type of person, 
the dynamic entrepreneur, to drive economic growth. He worried about the stifling 
of entrepreneurs by bureaucrats.  
Foucault’s approach could have been quite helpful to Max Weber, Polanyi, 
Hayek or Schumpeter, giving them more sophisticated and detailed ways of thinking 
about this socioalization process.   The genius of Foucault was to avoid the crudeness 
of Gramscian notions of “hegemony.”  Gramsci (and most of his Marxist forebears) 
never succeeded in showing why people might think like they do, except to see them 
as dupes.  Foucault shows how the “histoire des mentalités et des représentations” 
(history of ideas and representations of reality) must be constructed from small 
practices. Subjects are made through these practices and they become identified with 
them normatively.   
I now want to explore this issue in more detail, to demonstrate that the neo-
liberalist view of such dispositifs (although with corrected labeling) is more valid for 
big political-economic policies (macro-economic policy, financial liberalization, labor 
market rules) than for the small practices and tissue of millennial daily life and 
governmentality.  These latter practices have a much more complex generative 
process, and in many ways they do not stem from neo-liberal reason. 
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It will be helpful to start with Foucault himself, who had an ambivalent 
relationship to classical liberalism.  He was said to be a close reader of Adam Smith 
and David Hume, picking up on Smith’s point about how a decentralized system of 
“sentiments” entailed the weakening of centralized state bureaucracies and their 
dispositifs of social control (Protevi, 2009).   He was also said to have disliked the 
modern calculating individual, especially with regard to finance.  This has led to a 
widespread ongoing debate in France about whether Foucault was a liberal or even a 
libertarian or more of a typical Left Bank statist intellectual of his time.  He was very 
critical of the heavy forms of state dirigisme of social practices in France from the 
Third Empire all the way to post-Gaullist welfare statism – the Benthamite, 
panoptical, super-organized, top-to-bottom, cradle-to-grave, normative French state, 
protecting its population in the name of the paternalistic Republic.  His work on 
prisoners’ rights broke with the administrative welfare state. It was a principal 
starting point for what is called the “libertarian left” in France today, represented by 
the daily newspaper Libération.   Foucault was anything but nostalgic for what he saw 
was in some ways the stifling world of post-war organized welfare states, with their 
heteronormative class ideology and justification of widespread systems of social 
control (such as schools, the army, hospitals and mental hospitals and prisons) in the 
name of their paternalistic version of the common good. Movements for women’s 
rights, LGBT rights, anti-colonialism, the environment, anti-racism, and many other 
such movements were part of the Foucauldian notion of the resistance to submission 
in the name of social cohesion.  
But nor was Foucault unconcerned about market-based coercion nor did he 
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deny that the market could be used as an instrument of elite power.  He said clearly 
that Reagan-Thatcher were using state power to re-impose the rule of the market on 
recalcitrant populations. Along these lines, let’s think about several examples of the 
dispositifs of this millennial mix of  laissez-faire, plutocracy, authority, and – 
sometimes social conservativism that is rightly abhorred by many critics. 
The recent film The Big Short shows the world of Wall Street traders, with their 
cut-throat “killer” subjectivity.  The values of financial speculation, financial de-
regulation, and corporatist rent-earning from the rest of the economy are emblematic 
of a set of representations that fit the mold of the Victorian laissez-faire world we 
referred to earlier (but which, we insist, is not appropriately labeled liberal or neo-
liberal).  Large corporations often unashamedly game legal systems  -- offshoring 
their headquarters, using regulatory arbitrage for their investments across different 
political jurisdictions, and developing obscure contracting procedures with 
consumers.  These practices are the combinations of know-how, representations, 
behaviors and subjectivities or justifications that make up a dispositif.  This also 
supports Mirowski’s (2013) argument that many of these interests use state authority 
rather than try to weaken states.  
A second millennial dispositif, in the American context, consists of the 
enormous growth of the “donor class.” Using the wealth they concentrate from the 
new inequality, they shape elections, academic research and community action 
(through the shadow state of its foundations), to art museums and concert halls (with 
their donor plaques).  Its subjectivation process revolves around an elaborate “court 
society.”  The courtesans are in politics, academia and local communities, and the 
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intendance is assured by the professional operatives who bestow favors on them from 
the donor aristocracy, giving these favor-definers and bestowers privileged reflected 
glory positions  (Elias, 1985).  
A third kind of new dispositif is the rise of a geeky “start up,” “venture capital” 
world.  Its practices (now the subject of pop culture and television series) might be 
considered, with Foucault’s eye, to involve new forms of subjectivation and 
governmentality.  The social and political anthropology (or even archaeology) of the 
world as reshaped by Silicon Valley subjectivities and practices is just now beginning 
to be written (Turner, 2006). 
Finally, social policy has also produced many recent Foucauldian offspring.  
Michelle Alexander’s (2010) analysis of The New Jim Crow shows how segregationist 
policies in the USA moved out of the domain of explicit apartheid and absorbed the 
techniques of Foucault’s prisons, police, hospitals, and tax bureaucracies to control 
and discipline and segregate the bodies of black people.  These are linked to a matrix 
of social representations about law-and-order rather than race, and representations of 
fear of crime rather than (supposedly) fear of blackness. The enforcement of these 
new forms of governmentality involves intricate forms of new technical, legal and 
policing skills that create knowledge and shape the behavior of both dominators and 
dominated. 
Things get more complicated, however, when we stray from these obvious 
(and almost caricatural) examples, into the variegated texture of many other “small” 
economic practices in the post-1980s era. This is the supposedly neoliberal micro-
physics of power and subjectivity.  The first observation is the extremely large range 
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 I encountered the following list of sites, institutions, processes, and practices 
that were identified as neo-liberal (and I do not think the list is exhaustive): 
states, spaces, logics, techniques, technologies, discourses, discursive 
framework, ideologies, ways of thinking, projects, agendas, programs, 
governmentality, measures, regimes, development, ethnodevelopment, 
development imaginaries, global forms of control, social policies, 
multiculturalism, audit cultures, managerialism, restructuring, reform, 
privatization, regulatory frameworks, governance, good governance, NGOs, 
third sector, subjects, subjectivities, individualization, professionalization, 
normalization, market logics, market forms of calculation, the destatalization 
of government and the degovernmentalization of the state. That’s an 
impressive list….what is and what is not neo liberal ? 
 
 Mirowski (2013) argues that a wide variety of practices of daily life in the post-
millenial age, especially personal adaptation to more flexible labor markets (the “gig” 
and geek economy), the use of Facebook and other social networks, and other forms 
of contemporary networking, are part of the neo-liberal project, something like an 
update of Polanyi’s argument about market-oriented individual subjectivity. A 
rigorous use of Foucault’s method would be to evaluate each such practice, one by 
one, close to the ground.  First, Foucault would ask:  is the practice part of a dispositif? 
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, by which we mean: does it form part of an ensemble involving knowledge, power 
and subjectivation?  Secondly, it would ask:  are such practices, by some evidence, 
neo-liberal in origin or effect, or do they stem from some other set of social 
pragmatics?  
Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2010), offer the response that there is some kind 
of overall neo-liberal reference point that shapes all these practices, even when they 
see themselves as resistance, leading to a flexible sort of Gramscian hegemony:  
For three decades now, neoliberalism has defined the broad trajectory of 
urban restructuring, never predetermining local outcomes on the ground as if 
some iron law, but nevertheless profoundly shaping the ideological and 
operational parameters of urbanization. This historical offensive has also 
reshaped the terrain confronted by resistance movements, meaning that 
alternatives to market fundamentalism are now refracted through a 
tendentially neoliberalized ideological and institutional landscape. 
 
But this view of neo-liberalism as a hegemonic dispositif of millennial society is 
questionable.  For example, one major millennial transformation is how new 
technologies disintermediate services from large organizations such as firms and 
states.  Work is outsourced to juridically independent people, whether public or 
private. Uber is an iconic example of this. It is doubtful that Uber stems from neo-
liberal ideology, but rather emerges as a pragmatic response to the possibilities of 
reducing transaction costs and increasing capital utilization that are offered by new 
technologies.  
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And yet, as an unintended consequence, Uber may be subsequently justified 
normatively in neo-liberal terms, and Uber drivers may have a certain kind of “risk –
taking” subjectivity. Some of them might be victims of an economy in which all they 
wanted was a full-time job in a big corporation but could not find one, and hence 
find themselves at the mercy of Uber’s flex-work, in which case they do the job but 
don’t have the subjectivity. But perhaps some of them use Uber as an income 
supplement; or are students or stay-at-home-parents, combining flex-work with 
these other roles? Extending this, flex-time might also in part emerge from the 
choices of women who want to work part-time at home while blending roles of 
family and career; or from the emergence of many new service industries that are 
consumer-responsive; and from many othe technological and life-style changes.  Is 
“flex-time” a neo-liberalist anti-worker plot, or a leading edge of modern feminism 
(Leppel and Clain, 1993)?   
 At the same time, wage labor within organizations (whether the firm or the 
state) probably are subject to new forms of Foucauldian discipline, surveillance and 
punishment with the use of IT; the subjectivation of workers this way is not new, but 
the forms and methods certainly are with the advent of new technologies in the 
workplace. So, from a Foucauldian reading, it might be that the dispositif of full-time 
work is the new form of discipline and punish, while flex-time is the dispositif of new 
forms of liberated personal time, thus exactly reverssing the typical neoliberalist 
interpretation. In addition to power, there is also pragmatism at work in the 
inventiveness mentioned above.  The point is that many practices and public policies 
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are fashioned in a non-totalizing way, with unintended consequences and feedbacks 
that flow from complex pragmatism and changing  possibility sets (Zittoun, 2013).  
 
If we apply this kind of nuanced reasoning to the wide range of practices 
listed by Clarke, then many might be seen not as part of a neo-liberal assault, but 
could stem from its opposite, i.e. resistance, decentralization, and inventivity, along 
the lines of Foucault’s committee for prisoner’s rights or the many liberation 
movements since then, such as LGBT, community groups, environmentalists, and so 
on. Instead, the governmentality literature seems instead to display a nostalgic 
blanket rejection of many new practices.  Foucault himself was not nostalgic for the 
“good old days” of post-war welfare statism, a Fordist economy, and the 
conservative sociological underside of French civic republicanism.  He welcomed 
many of the libertarian Left’s new practices. 
 Indeed, as Ferguson (2010) argues, the paradox is that the literature ends up  
missing the proliferation of new post-statist  “arts of government” that are not neo-
liberal. The rejectionist, nostalgic and Manichean tone is curiously at variance with a 
great deal of the social movements literature. All in all, the critical neoliberalism 
literature has done a poor job of surveying the new dispositifs, understanding their 
causes, and has badly over-reached in labeling them as “neo-liberal.”   
 





Deregulated laissez-faire cities are very hard to find in the real world. Laissez 
faire practices and policies (what are mistakenly labelled “neo-liberal”) have 
proliferated, but they are more likely to be found at the level of macro-economics, 
labor policy, and international economics than at the specific scale of urban 
management and policy. Cities and regions are extensively regulated, especially land 
use and housing, and they incorporate massive public goods.  Moreover, in most 
countries, inter-regional transfers of income represent substantial proportions of state 
budgets, which are increasing in most countries.  
  Moreover, as in policymaking in general, much urban policy change is 
indeed less motivated by macro-ideology than by a complex pragmatics of dealing 
with an urban environment shaped by changing technologies, migration patterns, 
lifestyles, economic specialization, and economic development.  If anything, urban 
residents around the world are more demanding of a regulated and ordered urban 
physical environment than they are in their general political preferences.  
To begin to understand why cities have liberal economies, but are – as urban 
systems per se -- highly regulated, consider that they are dense congeries of 
individuals, households, groups, organizations, buildings, and infrastructures. The 
humans in cities have many kinds of activities -- productive, religious residential, 
military, symbolic, consumerist, leisure, and so on.  But they cannot locate all of these 
activities (nor their material containers) on the head of a pin.  So they must sort them 
out into different spaces.  
Dense interactions create all sorts of conflicts and problems of organization. In 
the dense human, material, ideological, cultural and institutional crucible of the city, 
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politics is shaped by people and interest groups, which have a wide variety of 
interests and preferences (Storper, 2014).  A short list of such groups would include 
corporations, NGOs, community groups, formal institutions, social movements, state 
officials, churches, gangs and mafias.  
Land use regulation is the principal authority of city governments, and 
powerful landed interests spend a great deal of time and resources in trying to obtain 
advantage in it.  At the same time, it is one of the domains in which they find 
themselves persistently most limited in their ability to achieve deregulation.  Even in 
the most liberal of cultures, property owners are rarely in favor of de-regulation of 
land use, and renters and non-owning residents even less so. Indeed, the global trend 
is to add layers of regulatory considerations to land use changes, such as 
environmental effects, density limits, social composition criteria (mixity), traffic 
generation criteria, design standards, and so on (Hsieh and Moretti, 2015). Why is 
this the case?  The obvious explanation is that land use is a concrete reality for the 
general public:  they see what it does, and they can fairly easily visualize how their 
local environment is affected by land use rules. Small landowners have a very strong 
interest in how such rules will affect their property values. Combined with majority 
voting at the local scale, land use decisions are one of those rare instances in which 
concentrated economic power -- big landowners  and developers – find themselves 
systematically confronted by a highly mobilized public.   The political apathy of 
national politics can be contrasted to the mobilization at the scale of neighborhoods. 
And everyone from average homeowners to renters to developers depends on  urban 
public goods to maintain access to their land and maintain its value.  
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The dense organizational tissue of cities and its complex set of decision-
making jurisdictions impede the fluid evolution of rules and regulations, and make 
de-regulation difficult. Indeed, clientelism, institutional and political exchange, are 
far more important than any kind of ideology in explaining most urban management 
(LeGalès, 2016).   
  The “principals” of urban public policy (variously, community groups, 
business groups, labor unions, neighborhood associations, homeowners, renters, etc), 
do evolve over time, through population change, economic change, lifestyle change, 
and changes in political norms and mobilization. There are also long-term changes in 
the background conditions for urban policies, from new technologies to lifestyle and 
family structure changes. Thus, to revisit our earlier example, with information 
technology, it is possible for a city to contract its garbage collection to a private firm 
(because the technology allows monitoring and control of the private actor in a way 
that was previously only possible within the public sector bureaucracy; thus, 
disintermediation).  In turn, information technology’s reduction in transaction and 
monitoring costs allows the latent possibility for small cities to reap the benefits of 
economies of scale in large private sector firms that serve many cities, to become a 
real option. This is a liberal change in the world of public policy that can be 
independent of any so-called neo-liberal belief system or subjectivity.  
In the context of a changing possibility set for urban public policy, equity and 
efficiency effects mix in complex and non-linear ways.  For example, sometimes 
efficiency effects are in favor of private provision, but there are distributional effects 
that disfavor certain groups (e.g. privatizations that raise productivity and lower 
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consumer prices, but reduce the number of public sector workers). Other times 
efficiency is greater in public provision (such as natural monopolies in mass urban 
transit or hospital-based health care), and the distributional effects favor public 
sector workers over private workers and, sometimes, ratepayers or taxpayers. 
Sometimes there are negative effects to consumers from publically-chartered 
monopolies, but positive effects on protected categories of workers (e.g. taxis versus 
Uber).  In other words, there are complex and highly varied relationships between 
efficiency, benefits to consumers/citizens, and benefits to public sector workers, that 
cannot be ranged neatly in boxes of neo-liberal or not.       
Moreover, because cities at a given stage of economic and social development 
have very similar pragmatic policy challenges.  There are four broad pragmatic 
influences on the provision of public goods: density, income level; divisions and 
borders; and distance.  Here we encounter additional limitations to a purely 
constructivist or “governmentality” approach to land use regulation, public goods 
provision, and urban management. 
First, certain kinds of public goods increase as a share of total consumption as 
density rises, because density is accompanied by increasing land prices and this 
causes, caeteris paribus, a reduction in housing size at a given level of real income.  
With smaller housing units, households turn to public parks and recreation facilities 
rather than their private yards, to public spaces for “hanging out” rather than 
extensive privatized spaces.  
 Second, public goods provision has a U-shaped relationship to real per capita 
income.  At first, public goods rise with increasing per capita income because this 
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expanded private income -- combined with economies of scale in service provision – 
lowers the opportunity cost tradeoff to private consumption.  However, as incomes 
rise, households and individuals tend to switch back to private provision, because 
budget constraints diminish and preferences for privacy can be satisfied.  At very 
low income levels, where needs are the highest, there is less capacity to provide such 
goods, and this distinguishes low-income cities from middle-to-high income ones. 
 Third, divisions of the population by ethnicity, social class, and territory affect 
the level of public goods.  The more divided the society, the lower level of public 
goods provision at a given level of real per capita income.  More ethnically 
homogeneous societies provide, on average, more public goods than divided ones, 
due to the role of social affinity in political decision-making; this can operate at a 
national scale across all the constituent jurisdictions, or it can operate at local or 
regional scale (Lindert, 2004).  When a national territory has strong internal borders 
(due to transport costs or due to social-ethnic divisions), goods will be provided 
more locally, but sometimes at the price of foregoing economies of scale.  
Finally, effective distance (i.e. borders and barriers) has a role in certain kinds of 
public goods provision.  In highly divided national territories, the costs of accessing 
public goods and services at a distance will be relatively high, and inversely in 
highly integrated geographies.  As the costs related to access at a distance decline, 
then it becomes cheaper to access those kinds of public goods that have high 
economies of scale, and hence there will be more of them. Conversely, if there are 
strong political or economic borders, goods provision will be more fragmented and 
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local, with foregone economies of scale, hence raising the cost and nature of such 
goods (World Bank, 2009).  
These forces are at least as important as ideology or power in shaping public 
goods provision in cities. Thus, Melbourne (highly liberal society) and Amsterdam 
(social market society) are more similar in the local public goods they provide than 
are national public expenditures of their respective countries (Australia, 26.3% of 
GDP and The Netherlands, 42.2% of GDP). Moreover, though the aggregate pattern 
of local public goods provision is very different when the four forces have strong 
variation, at a similar level of real per capita income, per capita provision of local 
public goods is similar.  For example, Los Angeles has a population density of about 
8000 persons per square mile, while Paris has a density of 58,000 per square mile.  
Paris has more parks per capita than Los Angeles.  But if we subtract the large part of 
the population in Los Angeles that has private outdoor space and calculate the public 
park space per Angeleno that has no such space, Paris and Los Angeles have very 
similar per capita levels of outdoor space as an amenity. Los Angeles has rather little 
public transit compared to the four other mega-cities of the developed world: 
London, New York, Tokyo and Paris.  But the share of users of public transit is also 
much lower, because in Los Angeles, a higher proportion of the population gets 
around by private automobile. Hence, the provision of public transit services per user 
of transit in Los Angeles is not so different from these other cities.  
As cities go through phase changes in their urban land nexus – notably as they 
go from lower to higher density -- there is a remarkable degree of convergence in 
regional public goods provision, at a given level of economic development. As LA’s 
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density has risen, and traffic has slowed, LA has undertaken the most ambitious 
metro construction program in the USA; this is a pragmatic, not ideological response 
to a problem.  In other words, though the precise content of these zones of public 
provision may differ from city to city and across historical periods, it is striking just 
how deliberately most cities are ordered and governed.  
It is true that different cities (and regions of the world) have histories of 
different “aggregate social welfare preferences” (as in the different sizes of the state 
in Australia and The Netherlands noted above).  In Europe, owing to its history, 
dirigiste nation-state policies have strongly oriented urbanization and urban policy 
since the late 19th century.  In the USA, with its more strongly liberal culture, urban 
planning has taken somewhat different forms and used somewhat different policy 
instruments.  Thus, whereas suburbs developed as a decentralized outcome of many 
forces (especially land availability, liberal incorporation rules, and federal highway 
construction), in France they were planned by the state in the New Cities (villes 
nouvelles) projects of the 1960s. But both responded to the same general set of 
pressures at roughly the same time.  
A final point can be made about the geography of both liberal and laissez-faire 
policies.  In this paper, we have noted the rise of extreme forms of laissez-faire, 
sometimes plutocratic ideologies in shaping policy for financial markets, the welfare 
state, labor market rules, health care, and other domains of social and economic 
policy.  Though these are not specifically urban policy domains, they do have effects 
that are highly urban. The growth of the financial sector, for example, is highly 
spatially agglomerated, and its labor force concentrates in major cities, creating 
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winner classes of people with high incomes, who compete for housing and carry out 
gentrification (Sassen, 1991).  Financial deregulation also transforms housing into a 
financial asset, and this has had strong effects on housing booms and busts in cities. 
Reshaped national welfare policies also most strongly affect urban residents (since 
there are many poor people in cities). But the “urban” is not the principal source of 
these policies; they are national-scale policies with concentrated urban effects.  It is 
an ecological fallacy to call them examples of fundamentally urban neo-liberalism 
(Scott and Storper, 2015). 
Even here, caution must be exercised.  There is little evidence of a world-wide 
rollback in social welfare protections, as measured by the percentage of GDP that is 
spent by the public sector in OECD countries, and specifically by the proportion of 
that devoted to public goods and social welfare expenditures.   The OECD average 
rose from 24%-26% between 2007-14, and only one OECD country (Hungary) saw 
this figure decline, and only marginally. In many countries around the world from 
South Korea to Brazil, social welfare systems are expanding (Lindert, 2004).  The 
rollback in welfare is a specifically Anglo-Saxon trend, and the neo-liberalism 
literature reflects a parochial point of view in this regard. Income inequality is indeed 
rising in many countries around the world, but this is not largely caused by a roll-
back in social welfare expenditures, but instead by the growing inadequacy of social 
welfare systems, which were designed in the mid-20th century, faced with the 
momentous contemporary shifts in technology, demography, and work (Atkinson, 
2015).  
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In any event, cities can at best act on the margins of these large-scale economic 
and societal changes and national policies.  For example, cities can use their land use 
regulation power to leverage certain kinds of corrective policies to economy-wide 
dynamics, as for example in requiring developers to include a certain level of low-
income housing in return for development approval. The paradox, of course, is that it 
is the richer cities – the local economies that are the winners in the new economic 
geography of the current era – that have both more revenue and more demand for 
their land, and therefore more leverage to soften the effects of global and national 
forces through urban policy; for example, they can regulate locationally-fixed private 
interests, such as land developers, non-tradeable economic sectors, and highly 
locationally concentrated trade-able sectors, without fear of capital mobility and 
disinvestment.  
 




In this paper, I have argued that much of the critical neoliberalism literature 
has become imprecise and over-reaching. First, much of the existing literature on 
neo-liberalism has failed to understand classical liberalism, which is centrally 
concerned with the appropriate border of state and market and concerned with 
income distribution as well.  Second, the historiography of much of the neoliberalism 
literature leads it to confuse a mid-twentieth-century movement to revive liberalism 
(i.e. appropriately-labeled neo-liberalism) with a late-twentieth century to radicalize 
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and deform liberalism into either laissez faire doctrine or plutocratic 
authoritarianism, a sort of oligarchic doctrine.  I argue that this confusion stems in 
part from the widespread hostility to markets (i.e. to liberalism) of many authors on 
neoliberalism and nostalgia for 20th century welfare states.  Third, the neoliberalism 
literature does open up a valuable use of the governmentality approach.  But it 
foregoes many possible insights that could be gained from this approach due to its 
tendency to classify highly differentiated social and economic practices into an 
overly-sweeping category of neo-liberal practices and subjectivation, compounded 
by an atavistic nostalgia for the “good old days” of mid-20th century society. Fourth, 
the literature hardly engages with elementary theories of urban public goods, 
regulation, and management, favouring an overly constructivist approach to such 
phenomena. 
One must ask how such a potentially important debate got to this point.   The 
critical neo-liberalism literature exhibits number of methodological weaknesses and 
biases that, in this author’s view, are frequently found in “critical” social science. On 
the whole, the critical neoliberalism literature has an ominous, anti-liberal, anti-
capitalist drumbeat.  The issue is not whether one is for or against markets or 
capitalism, as there are reasoned arguments that can be assembled for all such 
positions.  It is rather that normative bias can distort social science. In this type of 
writing, what they call neo-liberal ideas and practices are seen to be the fer de lance 
for markets and global capitalism, ready to unleash destruction of the social welfare 
state in the West and exploit workers in the Global South.  This normative bias might 
partly explain why the elementary analytics of liberalism is simply ignored.  It also 
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reflects the penchant for totalization and constructivism (“it’s all part of a big 
phenomenon”), rather than seeing the world as having many complex pragmatics 
(Jay, 1986; Zittoun, 2013). 
Another key methodological weakness of the literature is that it tends to 
eschew normal social science methods of tight definition, measurement and testing 
of evidence.   Thus,  “(n)eoliberalism, though, is an always-thwarted totality. Even 
under conditions of hegemony, it can only exist in hybrid form…..” (Peck, 2015: 173).  
As a result, critical analyses of this always-incomplete process must 
necessarily surpass binary declarations of absence/presence (or quantifications 
of more/less)…… (Peck: 2015: 173) 
In effect, then, the literature gives itself an all-purpose shield with which to propel 
evidence-based critique or verification, which is only exacerbated by the 
promiscuous use of terms such as “post-neo-liberalism” (Peck, Theodore and 
Brenner, 2010).   
The conclusion to be drawn is not that we should be unconcerned with the 
advent of plutocratic, cronyistic practices, laced with laissez-faire doctrines, nor with 
the micro-physics of power linked to them. It is that in order to get a better grasp on 
these issues we must use the tools of normal social science as well as critical 
qualitative methods.  In this, it is essential to resist any kind of Manichean a priori 
judgement of the phenomena under examination. With such distance, the field could 
hope to produce a more convincing analysis of the sources of policy and public 
management in cities, and of human subjectivation more generally. By not over-
reaching, it could also generate a more convincing critique of the worrying rise of 
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plutocratic, laissez-faire and authoritarian practices and ideologies, as well as a 
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1 Gyourko et al (2008) developed the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation 
Index, allowing them to rank states and metropolitan areas by level of regulation. 
The index has 12 sub-components that account for a variety of dimensions of the 
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regulatory environment.  There is a strong correlation between high-income, high-
wage metro areas and the level of regulation.   Lower-income metro areas (and 
states) have lower levels of regulation.  See Table 10, p. 711 and Table 11, page 713.  A 
selection of other well-recognized papers that document the link between regulation 
of housing construction and supply expansion, as well as the general expansion of 
regulation include Nelson et. al, 2002, OECD, 2005; Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013; 
Cheshire, 2009; Fischel, 1995, and Green Malpezzi and Mayo, 2003.  This paper is not 
about whether such regulation is good or bad, but is citing this as a starting point for 
a discussion about the extent to which we live in a de-regulated world, a key theme 
of arguments that neo-liberalism is pervasive.  
2 Liberalism has many origins, including the Italian cities of the early Renaissance, 
England after the 1688 revolution, the Scottish and French Enlightenments, and the 
American and French Revolutions (Fawcett, 2014; Pagden, 2012). In Britain, 
Germany, the US, France, and Italy, specific liberal traditions developed over time, 
and gave rise to many other syncretic and specific liberalisms across the globe 
(Fawcett, 2014). 
3 Ebenstein (2003) also points out that the title of the Road to Serfdom is basically a 
translation from Tocqueville’s (1835) concept of modern democratic servitude.  
Tocqueville (aka Alexis-Henri-Charles-Clérel, comte de Tocqueville) was an early 19th 
century observer of democracy and a liberal.   He stood for free trade, against slavery 
and against colonialism.  Yet he noted that democratic systems (notably that of 
America) had possible hidden routes to the loss of liberty, such as his famous 
“tyranny of the majority.”   These concerns are found directly in Hayek (1944), but a 
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century later and without the aristocratic and religious baggage carried by 
Tocqueville. 
4 It should be remembered that liberals such as Arrow and Robbins contested 
Rousseau’s concept of volonté générale (“general will”) which, though propagated in 
the context of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, had nonetheless been 
coopted extensively since then in various forms of justification of dictatorship – 
including both benevolent and authoritarian forms thereof.  This greatly animated 
thinkers from Hayek through Popper to Robbins and Arrow.  Arrow (1951) is one of 
the greatest defenders of the role of the state, in the left-Liberal tradition, and 
Amartya Sen admits that the problem of social choice cannot be resolved through 
traditional Statism or dirigisme, not to mention dictatorship.   
5 Thus, it is important to stress that mainstream liberalism was also working on de-
regulation from a different perspective. They saw the possibility of ending regulated 
monopolies in telecommunications and air travel for good technical reasons (their 
markets were now large enough for competition without sacrificing scale, and de-
regulation would generate variety and choice).  Such monopolies, in other words, 
corresponded to an earlier stage of economic development but were no longer 
necessary.  And time has shown the de-regulation of these sectors to be very 
beneficial to consumers and, in telecommunications, good for innovation.  
Technology has also changed notions of anti-trust in many other sectors, where the 
issue is no longer market share but whether the threat of technological change 
enforces competitive behavior and prevents rent-earning, as in the Microsoft case of 
the 1990s (US vs. Microsoft).  The point is that there are many sources of theories 
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about de-regulation, and many of them do not come from strong laissez-faire 
quarters today. 
6 I am going to put a number of phrases from Foucault’s work in the original French 
as well as English, drawing from the oral record of the courses at the Collège, Cours 
du Collège de France, which have been published in French in a series of books, 
starting in 1997 and ending in 2015, by the Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales, Gallimard, and Seuil, in collaboration.  These supplement 
Foucault’s principal books, which have been translated into English.    
7 Foucault remarked that his work was a “histoire de la pensée” (history of ideas).  And 
he defined this as, “Par pensée, je voulais dire une analyse de ce qu’on pourrait appeler des 
foyers d’expérience, où s’articulent les uns sur les autres: premièrement, les forms d’un savoir 
possible; deuxièmement, les matrices normatives de comportement pour les individus; et enfin 
des modes d’existence virtuels pour des sujets possibles.”   Thus:  “By ideas, I meant an 
analysis of what one could call the sites of experience, where experiences are 
interwoven with one another: firstly, the kinds of know-how that are possible; 
secondly, the normative matrixes of behavior for individuals; and finally the possible 
types of existence for possible types of subjects.”  
8 The term dispositif has no direct equivalent in English. It combines aspects of the 
words “tool,” “system,” “technique,” “pattern” and “device,” but its meaning is not 
captured by any one of them alone.  
